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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Problems in Giving Obscenity Copyright
Protection: Did Jartech and Mitchell Brothers
Go Too Far?*
I. INTRODUCTION
For more than 200 years courts and commentators have debated
the issue of whether the law should confer copyright protection on
indecent or immoral-"obscene"-works. Until recently the law in
this area was well-settled: obscene works were not copyrightable.2 In
Miller v. California,s however, the Supreme Court complicated the
analysis of the copyright-obscenity issue by defining obscenity in
terms of contemporary community standards. Though Congress in-
tended copyright law to be uniform and national in scope,4 Miller
requires a court to determine obscenity at the local level. Thus, a
work found obscene in only one part of the country would lose fed-
eral copyright protection. This result frustrates the policy of uni-
formity underlying the copyright statute.
Attempting to solve this dilemma, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Mitchell Brothers Film Group v.
Cinema Adult Theater5 abandoned the common-law rule that ob-
scenity is not copyrightable. Last year the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy6 followed
Mitchell Brothers and held that copyright holders of obscene mate-
rial have a valid cause of action for infringement.
This Recent Development traces in part II the emergence of the
* A later version of this article was submitted in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Copyright
Competition at the Vanderbilt University School of Law. The competition is sponsored by the
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP).
1. See Burnett v. Chetwood, [1816-1817] 2 Mer. Ch. 441 (1720), in which plaintiff brought
an action for injunctive relief to stop translation of a book from Latin into English. The equity
court granted relief even though the Latin work contained indecent material.
2. See infra part III.
3. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
4. See infra part IV(C), (D) and accompanying text.
5. 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
6. 666 F.2d 403 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 59, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 179 (1982).
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rule that obscenity is not copyrightable. Part III then examines the
courts' reasoning in Mitchell Brothers and Jartech and analyzes the
impact of these cases on copyright law. Part IV finds that although
these courts properly vindicate free expression, they fail to recognize
adequately the national policy against obscenity and the inconsis-
tency of affording federal copyright protection to materials that vio-
late federal obscenity laws. Thus, this Recent Development argues
that the strong national policy against obscenity, as manifested in
federal antiobscenity statutes, requires courts in some cases to deny
copyright protection to obscene works that violate a national obscen-
ity standard, even though that standard may not coincide with a local
community standard. A federal court could substitute for the com-
munity standard a balancing of various national interests such as the
following: (1) whether the degree of obscenity requires denial of cop-
yright on public policy grounds; (2) whether organized crime is pre-
sent in the works' creation, sale, or distribution; (3) whether the
works depict sexual exploitation of children; and (4) whether the
marketability of the work relies heavily on national distribution. This
list, though not exhaustive, represents concerns of the federal govern-
ment that Jartech and Mitchell Brothers overlook when they give
full copyright protection to works that inherently violate federal anti-
obscenity policy.
II. COPYRIGHT AND OBSCENITY: A LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Copyrightability of "Obscene" Works
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power "to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for lim-
ited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their re-
spective writings and discoveries." From this constitutional delega-
tion of power, Congress has enacted a body of law to protect all
"original works of authorship" from exploitation without the permis-
sion of the work's creator.9 Although the Constitution and the exten-
7. See infra note 67.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-
810 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). Although superseded by the 1976 Act, the Copyright Act of 1909,
ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1909)) (repealed 1976) may have some
relevance to works created before 1978.
Since 1790 Congress has amended the copyright laws from time to time to reflect the
changes in media; its latest statement is the Copyright Act of 1976. See generally Mitchell
Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 854-55 (5th Cir. 1979) (historical
discussion of copyright law), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
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sive copyright legislation do not expressly preclude immoral or "ob-
scene" works from copyright protection, the courts, through various
legal constructs, historically have deemed such works uncopy-
rightable. 10
The English courts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
created this obscenity exception to copyright largely because of their
belief that a judge should be the conservator of the public morality.
In Stockdale v. Onwhyn," for example, an English court of law re-
fused to award damages to a publisher who claimed that a subse-
quent publisher pirated the Memoirs of Harriette Wilson, an account
of the exploits of a notorious courtesan. The court held that publica-
tion of the book violated English obscenity laws because it contained
"highly indecent" materials. 12 The Stockdale court observed that En-
glish equity courts frequently refuse to grant injunctive relief to stop
piracy of morally objectionable works.13 These courts base denial of
injunctive relief on the doctrine of "unclean hands," which prevents a
plaintiff tainted by the illegality of publishing an obscene work from
enjoying the benefits of the court's equity authority.
1 4
10. See, e.g., Khan v. Leo Feist, Inc., 165 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1947) (song was copyrightable
because its lyrics were not lewd or immoral); Barnes v. Miner, 122 F. 480 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1903)
(immoral works are not works that "promote the progress of science and the useful arts" as
specified in Constitution); Broder v. Zeno Mauvais Music Co., 88 F. 74 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1898)
(song was uncopyrightable because it contained "vulgar" and "obscene" lyrics); Richardson v.
Miller, 20 F. Cas. 722 (C.C. Mass. 1877) (No. 11,791) (dictum that inherently immoral works
cannot be copyrighted); Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920 (C.C. Cal. 1867) (No. 9,173)
(neither party entitled to copyright protection; works held to be "grossly indecent and calcu-
lated to corrupt the morals of the people"); Bullard v. Esper, 72 F. Supp. 548 (N.D. Tex. 1947)
(copyright protection denied to both parties because copyright was not intended to protect
illegality or immorality); Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D. Cal. 1942) (ob-
scenity/copyright problem discussed in dictum); Simonton v. Gordon, 12 F.2d 116 (S.D.N.Y.
1925) (obscene materials are uncopyrightable but the book in question was not obscene); Hoff-
man v. Le Traunik, 209 F. 375 (N.D.N.Y. 1913) (a work must be free from immorality to be
copyrightable); Dane v. M. & H. Co., 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963) (strip tease
did not promote progress of science and useful arts); Shook v. Daly, 49 How. Pr. 366 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1875) (court refused injunctive relief for alleged piracy of an "immoral" play).
11. 108 Eng. Rep. 65 (K.B. 1826).
12. Id. at 66.
13. Id. at 65; see Chafee, Coming into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MiCH. L. REv. 1065
(1949).
14. The Fifth Circuit in Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d
852 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980), discussed the unclean hands doctrine
because the trial court had adopted the English rule to allow defendant to use an obscenity
defense in a copyright dispute. On appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed and noted that unclean
hands "has seldom been relied upon by courts that have denied copyright to obscene or im-
moral works." Id. at 861.
Another English theory for denying copyright protection to obscene or immoral works was
the so-called "property theory." The property theory posited that a person cannot have a prop-
erty right in something that the law would prohibit him from publishing. See Phillips, Copy-
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In the late nineteenth century a federal court in Martinetti v.
Maguire15 first applied the Stockdale rule in the United States. In
Martinetti the court denied injunctive relief to both parties in a dis-
pute over the copyright to a play. Plaintiff claimed that defendant's
play, the "Black Crook," copied his work, the "Black Rook." Al-
though the court held that both works were uncopyrightable because
they lacked originality, it suggested that the women's provocative
dress in the "Black Crook" influenced its ruling."6 The court noted
that the "principal part and attraction of the spectacle seems to be
the exhibition of women in novel dress or no dress. . . ."I Although
the Martinetti judge denied that he was acting as a conservator of
public morality by denying copyright, he concluded that "it is the
duty of all courts to uphold public virtue, and [to] discourage and
repel whatever tends to impair it."' Furthermore, he stated that the
spectacle "panders to a prurient curiosity or an obscene imagination
by very questionable exhibitions and attitudes of the female
person."19
The Martinetti court technically held that the dramatic content
of the two plays was so immoral that the works did not promote the
progress of science or useful arts and, hence, did not fall under the
ambit of the constitutional copyright clause.20 Other courts followed
Martinetti and used statutory or constitutional interpretation to jus-
tify their refusals to allow a copyright; the true motive behind these
holdings, however, was a sense of moral outrage.21 In 1875, for exam-
right in Obscene Works: Some British and American Problems, 6 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 138, 142-
44 (1977). Courts at law used the property theory while the equity courts used the unclean
hands theory. Id.
15. 16 F. Cas. 920 (C.C. Cal. 1867) (No. 9,173).




20. The courts' use of a constitutional interpretation to exclude obscenity from copyright
protection offers a stronger basis for the exception than the property or unclean hands theories.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text. According to Professor Nimmer, however, the con-
stitutional language that copyright should "promote the progress of science and the useful arts"
is not a requirement but a preamble stating the intention of copyright protection. 1 M. NIM-
MEn, ON COPYhIoHT § 1.03[A] (1982).
21. For example, the court in Barnes v. Miner, 122 F. 480 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1903), held that
a play called X-Rays of Society was not copyrightable because it did not promote the progress
of science or the useful arts. The play's scantily clad actresses probably influenced the court's
strict interpretation of the constitutional language. See id. at 489. The actual denial of copy-
right protection, however, stemmed from the play's lack of dramatic value rather than its ob-
scenity. Id. at 489-90; see Leverson, Copyright and Obscenity: Towards a National Standard?,
7 PERF. ARTS REv. 495, 501 (1977).
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ple, a New York court stated, "The rights of the author are secondary
to the right of the public, to be protected from what is subversive of
good morals."",
In 1909 Congress rewrote the copyright law and expanded its
coverage from specific types of writing "intended to be perfected as
works of the fine arts"2 3 to "all the writings of an author."24 Notwith-
standing this change,2 5 the courts confronting obscenity-copyright
problems in the early 1900's maintained that promotion of science
and the useful arts did not encompass protection of immoral works.26
Rather than act as moral referees, however, the courts began to re-
quire not mere moral objectionability but a finding of criminal ob-
scenity before they would deny copyright protection. For example, in
Simonton v. Gordon27 a federal court held that a play, White Cargo,
infringed upon the copyright of a novel, Hell's Playground, even
though the judge found the novel and play to be "unnecessarily
coarse and highly sensual."" Although the court affirmatively cited
the rule that obscenity cannot be copyrighted," the judge noted that
"[wihatever may be the view of a prudist with respect to Hell's Play-
ground, I think that the book, when judged by the standards of cur-
rent literature, should not be held to be unentitled to copyright
22. Shook v. Daly, 49 How. Pr. 366, 368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1875). In Broder v. Zeno Mauvais
Music Co., 88 F. 74 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1898), the court held uncopyrightable the song "Dora Dean"
because it contained the lyrics "She's the hottest thing you ever seen." The court found the
word "hottest" objectionable because it implied lewd and lustful behavior in women. Id. at 79.
Although the court found that plaintiff pirated "Dora Dean" from defendant, it determined
that since the original contained the objectionable lyrics, the song could not be copyrighted.
Thus, the court dismissed plaintiff's claim and defendant's counterclaim. Id.
The Broder decision may seem ludicrous by today's standards, but as recently as 1978 the
Supreme Court maintained that certain "offensive" words dealing with sex may be banned
from radio airwaves. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (comedian George Car-
lin's monologue entitled "Filthy Words" banned). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976)(broadcast-
ing "indecent" language prohibited); Comment, Obscenity and Copyright: An Illustrious Past
and Future?, 22 S. TEx. L.J. 87, 95 n.56 (1981).
23. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1909). An earlier version
required that the work be "designed or suited for public representation." Act of August 18,
1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (repealed 1909).
24. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 2) (repealed 1976).
25. Some observers have commented that this statutory change displaced Martinetti. See
Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 855 n.4 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); Comment, The Obscenity Defense to Copyright Revisited, 69 KY.
L.J. 161, 164-65 (1981).
26. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
27. 12 F.2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).
28. Id. at 124. Both the book and play portrayed an Englishman's torrid affair with a




In Cain v. Universal Pictures Co.31 the court rejected the ob-
scenity defense in a copyright case concerning the film When To-
morrow Comes. In the motion picture the protagonist and a girl en-
gaged in what the court called "indecent and vulgar" acts before a
church altar.3 2 The court, however, did not apply the Martinetti rule
to invalidate the copyright; rather, the judge applied the definition of
obscenity that the United States Post Office used to eliminate por-
nography from the mails." This test considers the work as a whole
and proscribes the work if it has a "direct tendency to corrupt
morals. 3 4 The court noted that "mere vulgarity or coarseness of lan-
guage does not condemn [the work]"3 5 and found that the film's di-
dactic ending, in which the girl who desecrated the altar was killed,
cured the film of any possible immorality. 6
Although Cain and Simonton indicate a growing reluctance to
invalidate a copyright for the immoral content of the underlying
work, many courts continued to apply the Martinetti rule in cases of
copyright and obscenity. For example, in Bullard v. Esper"7 a federal
court considering several adult films refused to uphold a copyright
for either plaintiff or defendant. The court applied the United States
Post Office obscenity test and found that the films would bring "the
30. Id. Similarly, in Khan v. Leo Feist, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 165 F.2d
188 (2d Cir. 1947), a federal court upheld the copyright in the song, "Rum and Coca-Cola,"
even though defendant claimed that the song's lyrics hinted of prostitution. Plaintiff objected
to, inter alia, the following lyrics:
Since the Yankee come
to Trinidad
They got the young
girls all goin' mad




70 F. Supp. at 451. The court noted that the song's allegedly "lewd" lyrics seemed to describe
accurately the natives' life among the American troops in the area and, hence, were not ob-
scene. As with Simonton, a showing that questionable content truly reflects a real situation
excuses what the court otherwise would deem indecent content. On appeal the Second Circuit
noted that although the lyrics were "cheap and vulgar," the likelihood that they would promote
lust was remote. 165 F.2d at 192-93.
31. 47 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
32. Id. at 1018.
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976).
34. 47 F. Supp. at 1018. Courts and the Post Office no longer use this definition of ob-
scenity. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
35. 47 F. Supp. at 1018.
36. Id.
37. 72 F. Supp. 548 (N.D. Tex. 1947).
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blush of shame to the cheek of virtue."38 Citing the Simonton reason-
ing that a depiction of reality, though immoral or salacious, may not
invalidate the copyright, the court said that "nothing in either pic-
ture . . . commends itself.""9
Indeed, as recently as 1963 courts applied a highly restrictive
reading of the Constitution's copyright clause to invalidate or disal-
low copyrights for works of questionable morality.40 Although later
courts showed a reluctance to act as censors or moral referees in
awarding copyright protection, a court's finding that a work was
criminally obscene clearly would establish grounds to withhold copy-
right protection. As the Nation's attitudes toward sex became more
liberal, however, a precise definition of criminal obscenity became
more elusive. Not until 1973, in Miller v. California,41 did the Su-
preme Court establish the contemporary definition of obscenity.
42
The Miller Court, however, did not consider the effect of its flexible
definition of obscenity on copyright cases; only recently in Mitchell
Brothers and Jartech has its impact on federal copyright law become
apparent.43
B. Obscenity
Until the eighteenth century, obscenity actually was not a crime
at common law.44 In fact, so long as the work did not degrade or
38. Id. at 548. The "blush" test had its roots in the English case Regina v. Hicklin, 3
L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868). The Supreme Court in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), dis-
carded this test.
39. 72 F. Supp. at 548.
40. For example, in Dane v. M. & H. Co., 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963), a
New York court refused to allow a common law copyright to plaintiff's satirical strip-tease
dance. Although the court did not express the moral outrage exhibited by earlier courts, it
found that the dance was not copyrightable because it failed to promote the progress of science
and the useful arts, id. at 429. This constitutional interpretation parallels the Martinetti rea-
soning. This case arose in a state court because before January 1, 1978, the states could enforce
common law copyright. Since the Copyright Act of 1976 became effective, however, virtually all
copyright law emanates from federal statute. See infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
41. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
42. The three-part Miller test consists of findings that: (1)" 'the average person, applying
contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest"; (2) "the work depicts ... in a patently offensive way sexual conduct...
specifically defined by state law"; (3) "the work, taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value." Id. at 24; see infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
43. See infra part II.
44. See Dominus Rex v. Curl, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (1727). The title of the book in question
was Venus in the Cloister, or The Nun in Her Smock and dealt with lesbianism in a convent.
The court found the book's publisher, Edmund Curl, guilty of obscenity, although one of the
judges believed that the work was acceptable because the religious elements primarily were
anti-Roman Catholic and not anti-Anglican. See F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENrry 5-6 (1976)
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blaspheme the established religion, the government rarely prosecuted
material with explicit sexual content until the ninteenth century.4 5 In
1868, however, the Queen's Bench in Regina v. Hicklin46 formulated
a standard for the prosecution of obscenity as a common-law crime.
The Hicklin court determined that the standard of obscenity was
whether the material adversely affected the most sensitive persons in
the community. The Hicklin case also held that a court rightly could
condemn a work for specific obscene passages, even if the work taken
in its entirety was not morally objectionable. 7 The Hicklin standard
continued to be the prevailing obscenity test in England well into the
twentieth century.'8
Although courts in the United States followed the Hicklin test,
American judges often limited its application. 9 In 1933 United
States v. One Book Called "Ulysses"50 foreshadowed the end of the
Hicklin test in this country. Judge Woolsey decided to allow the
James Joyce masterpiece Ulysses to enter the United States because
the book's author did not intend his work to appeal to the reader's
prurient interests. In addition to applying this new intent standard,
the judge held that the court must evaluate the work in its entirety
and find the work offensive to the average person in the community,
not the locale's most sensitive reader.5 1
As Hicklin became discredited, the American courts struggled to
(citing discussion of Curl in Reynolds, Our Misplaced Reliance on Early Obscenity Cases, 61
A.B.A. J. 220, 221 (1975)).
45. See F. SCHAuER, supra note 44, at 1-29.
46. 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868).
47. Id. at 371. As one commentator has remarked, the Hicklin test made obscene that
which affected "the most feebleminded and susceptible in the community." Comment, supra
note 22, at 88.
48. In fact, the English courts zealously embraced the role of conservator of public moral-
ity. For example, in Glyn v. Weston Feature Film Co., [1916] 1 Ch. 261, the court refused to
grant copyright protection to a popular novel that portrayed an extramarital love affair. Judge
Younger condemned the work because it tended to "advocat[e] free love and justif[y] adultry
where the marriage tie has become merely irksome." Id. at 269. One recent commentary on this
area of English law noted that Glyn is the last substantive English decision on the copyright-
obscenity issue. Phillips, supra note 14, at 151.
49. See United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 14, 571) (gov-
ernment can base obscenity prosecution on portions of work); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17
Mass. 336 (1821) ("Fanny Hill" banned under Hicklin test). Reliance on Hicklin continued well
into this century. See Bullard v. Esper, 72 F. Supp. 548 (N.D. Tex. 1947) (Obscenity is that
which brings "the blush of shame to the cheek of virtue.").
Concurrently, other courts limited the doctrine's application. See United States v. Ken-
nerley, 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (material honestly in the expression of innocent ideas should
not be obscene); supra note 35 and accompanying text.
50. 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
51. 5 F. Supp. at 184-85.
OBSCENITY COPYRIGHT
find a workable definition of obscenity. In 1957 the Supreme Court in
Roth v. United States52 initiated a stormy twenty-year evaluation of
obscenity definitions. In Roth the Court held that obscenity was not
protected "speech" under the first and fourteenth amendments."
The Roth test required a prosecutor to show that under contempo-
rary community standards the predominant theme of the material,
taken as a whole, appealed to the prurient interests of the average
person.54
In Memoirs v. Massachusettts5 the Supreme Court refined the
obscenity standard by requiring that courts find three elements
before condemning a work as obscene. First, the dominant theme of
the material taken in its entirety must appeal to a prurient interest
in sex .5 Second, the material must be patently offensive to commu-
nity standards relating to the description or representation of sexual
matters. Last, the material must be utterly without redeeming social
value. 7 The "utterly without redeming social value" segment of the
Memoirs test was particularly controversial because it required the
prosecution to carry the heavy burden of showing that a work lacks
even a scintilla of artistic worth.5
Supported by only a three-judge plurality, the Memoirs standard
received criticism from other members of the Court. 9 The Court
floundered for seven years in attempting to define obscenity, but no
single standard could win the support of five justices. The Court
summarily overturned obscenity convictions when five justices, each
52. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
53. Id. at 485.
54. Id. at 490.
55. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
56. "Prurient interest" refers to "that which shows erotic sexuality in a manner designed
to create some form of immediate stimulation." F. SCHAUER, supra note 44, at 101-02. In Miller
the court gave several examples of what might appeal to the prurient interest: "(a) Patently
offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or
simulated[, and] (b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excre-
tory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 25. Indeed,
without a finding of an appeal to the prurient interest, a court cannot condemn sexually related
material as obscene.
57. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. at 418.
58. In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), Chief Justice Burger revealed the contro-
versy generated by the Memoirs decision. Burger noted that the Memoirs test had "never com-
manded the adherence of more than three Justices at one time." Id. at 25. Justice Harlan, for
example, wrote that the "utterly without redeeming social value" test may have no real mean-
ing. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 459 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Even Justice
Brennan, who devised the Memoirs test, abandoned it in his dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 81-82 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Even this [Memoirs] formulation, how-
ever, concealed differences of opinion.")
59. See supra authorities cited note 58.
1983] 411
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using his own test, determined that the material in queston was "ob-
scene."60 Finally, in Miller v. Californias" the Court evaluated what it
called "the somewhat tortured history of ... obscenity decisions"62
and modified the Memoirs obscenity test. The Court reaffirmed the
Roth pronouncement that the first amendment does not protect ob-
scenity and eliminated the third part of the Memoirs test, which re-
quired proscribed material to be utterly without redeeming social
value. 3 The Court authorized states to regulate obscene materials
with statutes that meet the following constitutional minimum re-
quirements: (1) state law as written or authoritatively construed must
specifically define the forbidden conduct; (2) the statute must apply
only to works that, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient sexual
interest and that portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way;
and (3) the proscribed material or conduct must lack serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.6 4
In addition to redefining obscenity, the Court expressly rejected
a national obscenity standard. The five-to-four majority held that
"obscenity is to be determined by applying 'contemporary commu-
nity standards,' not 'national standards.' "65 Prior to Miller the Court
had flirted with a national standard for obscenity. In Manual Enter-
prises v. Day,"6 for example, Justice Harlan noted that a "national
standard of decency" should apply when the government prosecutes
obscenity under federal statutes.6 7 In Jacobellis v. Ohios8 the Court
60. See, e.g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967). The Court decided 31 cases in this
manner. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 22 n.3.
61. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller concerned a conviction under California's antipornography
laws for distributing obscene material through the mail. Decided with Miller were United
States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); United States v. Twelve 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123
(1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973).
62. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 20.
63. Id. at 23-25. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the five-member majority, noted that a
majority of the Court had never embraced the "'utterly without redeeming social value'" test.
Id. at 24-25 (quoting Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1965)) (emphasis in
Memoirs).
64. Id. at 24; see supra note 56.
65. 413 U.S. at 37 (citations omitted). For a discussion of a national obscenity standard,
see infra part IV(C), (D).
66. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
67. Id. at 488. The following federal statutes regulate obscenity: 18 U.S.C. § 1461
(1976)(mailing obscene or crime-inciting matter prohibited); 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1976) (importa-
tion or transportation of obscene matters prohibited); 18 U.S.C. § 1463 (1976)(mailing indecent
matter on wrappers or envelopes prohibited); 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976)(broadcasting obscene
language prohibited); 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1976)(transportation of obscene matters for sale or dis-
tribution prohibited); 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (Supp. III 1979)(use of children under age 16 in produc-
tion of pornographic materials illegal); 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1976) (importation of immoral articles
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reaffirmed the position that national obscenity standards applied to
federal prosecutions. Two companion cases to Miller,69 however, dis-
counted any application of a national obscenity standard. Then in
1974 the Court conclusively overruled the application of a national
obscenity standard in federal prosecutions and held that the Miller
reliance on contemporary community standards applied to all ob-
scenity cases.
70
This reliance on contemporary community standards and the re-
jection of a national standard create problems in applying federal
copyright law to obscenity cases because varying local standards now
govern the definition of obscenity. Thus, if a work is obscene by local
community standards, then a court applying the Martinetti rule that
obscene works are uncopyrightable must invalidate the work's copy-
right provided by federal law. 1 In Mitchell Brothers and Jartech,
however, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits avoided this result by aban-
doning the Martinetti rule and holding that obscenity, though illegal
and not protected by the first amendment, is eligible for copyright
protection.
prohibited); 39 U.S.C. 3001 (1976) (nonmailable matter); 39 U.S.C. § 3006 (1976)(unlawful mat-
ter); 39 U.S.C. § 3007 (1976)(detention of mail for temporary periods); 39 U.S.C. § 3008
(1976)(prohibition of pandering advertisements); 39 U.S.C. § 3010 (1976)(mailing of sexually
oriented advertisements regulated); 39 U.S.C. § 3011 (1976) (judicial enforcement). See F.
SCHAUER, supra note 44, at app. D.
68. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
69. United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 145 (1973); United States v. Twelve 200-Ft.
Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 129-30 (1973).
70. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974). The community standards rationale is
reasonable for most obscenity prosecutions, but the rationale diminishes when the government
prosecutes under the customs violation statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1976), in which the port of
entry often is unrelated to the relevant community for the Miller test. See F. SCHAUER, supra
note 44, at 131. Similarly, federal copyright law and the community standards doctrine may be
incompatible: while copyright law seeks uniformity, community standards vary from area to
area. See infra notes 126-28 & 142-48 and accompanying text.
71. The supremacy clause provides in relevant part: "This Constitution, and the laws of
the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme law of
the land. . . ." U.S. CONST. art. VI. Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, the state common law of
copyright generally protected unpublished works and federal copyright statutes protected pub-
lished works. On January 1, 1978, both published and unpublished works became subject to
virtually exclusive federal copyright protection. In most cases, therefore, federal copyright law
preempts any state efforts to regulate copyright. See generally M. NIMMER, supra note 20, §
1.01[B] (1982).
A determination under state law that a work is obscene and, hence, uncopyrightable, ar-
guably conflicts with the national policy of uniformity. The supremacy clause of the Constitu-
tion would seem to render unconstitutional a finding that would conflict with federal copyright
law. See 2 C. ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12:143 (1969).
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III. RECENT DEVELOPMENT: Mitchell Brothers AND Jartech
The Fifth Circuit's 1979 decision in Mitchell Brothers Film
Group v. Cinema Adult Theater72 and the Ninth Circuit's opinion
three years later in Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy"3 parted with more than a
century of American copyright precedent and expressly held that ob-
scene materials are copyrightable. 74 These well-reasoned decisions
underscore the difficulties courts encounter in applying the Miller
community standards rule to federal copyright problems.
A. Mitchell Brothers
Mitchell Brothers arose from an action brought by copyright
holders against an adult cinema that allegedly showed pirated copies
of a copyrighted film. 7 5 The trial court held for defendant and relied
upon Martinetti for the rule that obscene works are not copyright-
able. 6 On appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that section 4 of
the Copyright Act of 1909 7 impliedly allowed the copyrighting of ob-
scene works by conferring protection on "'all the writings of an au-
thor.' ,,78 The court examined the various theories that previous
courts had used to justify invalidating or denying copyright protec-
tion to allegedly immoral works. The Mitchell Brothers court dis-
cussed and rejected the moral conservator theory of copyright invali-
dation'7 9 the property interest theory,80 and the unclean hands
equitable doctrine."' The court concluded that the "copyright hold-
ers' actions are not inconsistent with any policy of the copyright
laws" and, therefore, an action for copyright infringement can exist.82
The Mitchell Brothers court said that Congress should determine
whether to deny copyright protection to obscenity, and the court
noted that "Congress has not chosen to refuse copyrights on obscene
72. 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
73. 666 F.2d 403 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 59, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 179 (1982).
74. See supra note 10.
75. For a discussion of the district court opinion, see Leverson, supra note 21, at 495-97;
Comment, supra note 22, at 98-99.
76. No. CA-3-74-645-D (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 1976). The court did not publish its opinion in
the Federal Supplement. See Leverson, supra note 22, at 495. The district court used the un-
clean hands doctrine to justify its acceptance of the obscenity defense to copyright infringe-
ment. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
77. Copyright Act of 1909, Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1970))
(repealed 1976).
78. Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d at 858 n.13.
79. Id. at 861; see supra notes 11-13 and acccmpanying text.
80. 604 F.2d at 861; see supra note 14.
81. 604 F.2d at 861-65; see supra note 14.
82. 604 F.2d at 865.
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materials, and we should be cautious in overriding the legislative
judgment on this issue.""3
B. Jartech
In Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy84 plaintiffs alleged that defendants il-
legally copied five adult films shown in plaintiffs' theatre.85 In an ef-
fort to gather evidence to enforce a municipal nuisance ordinance
against plaintiffs' cinema, a city investigator entered the theatre,
photographed the films, and recorded the soundtracks.8s Defendants
used this evidence to declare the theatre a nuisance, revoke the busi-
ness' licenses and permits, and initiate nuisance abatement proceed-
ings.87 The jury found that: (1) each of the five films was obscene; (2)
defendants were responsible for copying the five movies without per-
mission of the copyright holders; (3) the unauthorized copying and
use in the nuisance abatement proceedings was a fair use; and (4)
defendants realized no profits from the copyright infringement.8 8 The
trial court entered a judgment against plaintiffs for attorney's fees
because the copyright infringement suit was vexatious and intended
to harass defendants.8 9
On appeal the Ninth Circuit confronted the following issues: (1)
whether obscenity is a defense to a copyright infringement action; (2)
whether defendants' use of copyrighted material was fair;90 and (3)
whether the award of attorney's fees was justified. The Jartech court
83. Id. at 863.
84. 666 F.2d 403 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 59, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 179 (1982).
The same Mitchell brothers who litigated Mitchell Brothers were plaintiffs in Jartech. 666 F.2d
at 403.
85. 666 F.2d at 405. Jartech, Inc. was also a defendant in Mitchell Brothers. 604 F.2d at
852.
86. 666 F.2d at 405.
87. Id.
88. Id. Following the jury verdict, defendants counterclaimed that the films be seized as
contraband. The court rejected the counterclaim because the verdict mooted it. Id.
89. Id. Under 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1976), a court may use its discretion to grant attorney fees
to the prevailing party. The court noted that the district court in Mitchell Brothers had held
that obscene works were not copyrightable. See 666 F.2d at 407. The Fifth Circuit, of course,
reversed the district court on appeal. See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
90. The Copyright Act of 1976 codifies the defense of fair use at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
The fair use considerations are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and




reversed the trial court on the first and third issues, holding that ob-
scenity is not a defense to a copyright infringement action and that
the award of attorney's fees was unwarranted. The court, however,
affirmed the district court on the issue of fair use, holding that defen-
dants' infringement of the copyright was excusable because defen-
dants did not copy the films for commercial exploitation.91 In holding
that obscenity is not a defense to copyright infringement actions, the
court relied not only upon Mitchell Brothers92 but also upon Belcher
v. Tarbox,93 which concerned copyrights of fraudulent materials. In
Belcher the Ninth Circuit noted that "[t]here is nothing in the Copy-
right Act to suggest that the courts are to pass upon the truth or
falsity, the soundness or unsoundness, of the views embodied in a
copyrighted work.
'94
Jartech is significant because it is the first major obscenity-copy-
right case under the Copyright Act of 1976.11 The court noted that
"[p]rior law [1909 Act] referred to 'all writings of an author,' while
the current statute employs the similar phrase 'original works of au-
thorship.' "e Discussing the application of an obscenity definition
based on community standards to federal copyright law, the court
argued that the obscenity defense would fragment copyright enforce-
ment because it would protect materials held not obscene in one
community while it would "authoriz[e] pirating" in a community that
held the works obscene.
97
91. 666 F.2d at 407; see supra note 90. The Ninth Circuit has added some judicial gloss to
the fair use provisions of the Act. In the highly publicized "Betamax" case, Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 972-74 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S.
Ct. 2926 (1982), the court examined whether the alleged infringers copied the material to use it
for its intrinsic purpose. In Sony the Ninth Circuit held that copying by home video recorders
was for the works' intrinsic purpose-entertainment. In Jartech, however, the court found that
defendants did not copy the films and record their soundtracks to enjoy the intrinsic benefits of
the films, but rather to gather evidence. Sensing that its statutory interpretation may be
strained, the Jartech court noted that "the statutory standards are not precisely applicable to
the facts at bar." 666 F.2d at 407.
92. 666 F.2d at 406. The Ninth Circuit also cited the latest revision of Professor Nim-
mer's treatise, which endorses the holding in Mitchell Brothers. Id. Professor Nimmer consid-
ers the Mitchell Brothers decision to be the prevailing view. See 1 M. NIMuER, supra note 20, §
2.17.
93. 486 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1973).
94. Id. at 1088. The Fifth Circuit likewise relied upon Belcher in Mitchell Bros. See
Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
95. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). Mitchell Brothers was decided under the 1909 Act. See supra
note 77 and accompanying text.
96. Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d at 406.
97. Id. The court should have explored other solutions to this dilemma instead of simply
holding that all obscenity can be copyrighted. See infra part IV.
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C. Analysis
Both the Mitchell Brothers and Jartech courts determined that
the need for national copyright protection for the films in question
outweighed the state and federal public policies against obscenity."
Each case places great emphasis on the absence of language in the
1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts that would preclude copyrights for ob-
scene materials.9 Although the courts' position has some merit, a
closer analysis of section 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976100 under-
mines this statutory interpretation.
According to section 102 of the 1976 Act, "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium" may obtain copyright pro-
tection." 1 The Jartech court construes this section to imply that any
author who meets the requirements of originality and fixation in a
tangible medium may obtain a copyright, even though the content of
his work is obscene and, therefore, illegal. 102 The legislative history
98. A recent survey by the Supreme Court stated that 49 states either legislatively or
judicially have adopted standards for obscenity regulation. Alaska is the only state currently
without an obscenity law. See New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 3354 n.7; F. SCHAUER, supra
note 44, § 10.1, at 192-97. Congress enacted 20 obscenity laws between 1942 and 1956, most of
which the government still enforces. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 105
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); supra note 67.
99. Although the copyright statute is silent on whether it protects obscene works, the
Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1150 (1976) ("Lanham Act"), which protects regis-
tered trademarks, precludes registration of any mark consisting of "immoral, deceptive, or
scandalous matter." Trade-Mark Act of 1946, § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (a) (1976). See, e.g., In re
Rundorf, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. 1971), (§ 2(a) of Lanham Act
prohibits registration of tradename in question because the tradename would be offensive to
the public). But see In re Thomas Laboratories, Inc., 189 U.S.P.Q. (B.N.A.) 50 (Trademark
Trial & App. Bd. (1975) (appeals board reversed examiner's denial of trademark registration).
These cases may be distinguishable because the Thomas Laboratories panel used an obscenity
standard rather than the moral objectionability standard that the Lanham Act seems to con-
template and the Rundorf panel followed.
The patent statute, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1976), has no express provisions proscribing patent
protection for obscene or immoral devices. The courts, however, may deny patent protection to
devices that courts determine serve unlawful or immoral purposes. See generally, National Au-
tomatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89 (N.D. Ill. 1889)(devices used solely for gambling lack
utility and are, hence, unpatentable). The courts rapidly are eroding this rule, and in many
cases the United States Patent & Trademark Office will allow patents for inventions that are
useful solely in gambling. See Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. 801 (BNA) (Patent & Trademark
App. Bd. 1977).
Some commentators read these patent and trademark law provisions-which are reasona-
bly analogus to copyright law-to support the view that Congress implicitly intended to protect
obscene works under the copyright law. See Comment, supra note 25, at 170-73. Other writers
on the subject argue that the trademark and patent law prohibitions on obscenity indicate the
need for a similar prohibition in the copyright regime. See Leverson, supra note 21, 518-21.
100. The corresponding portion of the 1909 Act is 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
101. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
102. See Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d at 406.
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for section 102 shows that Congress purposely left undefined the
phrase "original works of authorship" and intended to incorporate
without change the common law accumulated under the 1909 Act.
The House Judiciary Committee further stated: "This standard does
not include requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or aesthetic merit,
and there is no intention to enlarge the standard of copyright protec-
tion to require them."'03 The Mitchell Brothers court makes the
same argument about the language in Section 4 of the 1909 Act,
which confers copyright protection on "all writings of an author.
'10 4
Arguably, both courts' statutory interpretation confuses a denial
of copyright for "bad" art with a denial of copyright for obscene
works-material not protected by the first amendment.105 In Bleis-
tein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.108 the Supreme Court held that
circus posters could be copyrighted even though they were "low art."
Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes commented that judges should
not act as art critics, conferring copyright protection only on those
works that they deem to be "art." Justice Holmes said "It would be a
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to consti-
tute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.' 10 7 Courts and ju-
ries, however, must formulate definitions of obscenity to enforce lo-
cal, state, and federal antiobscenity statutes. Clearly, the first amend-
ment and copyright law protect "bad art." Obscenity, however, is one
of the narrow exceptions to free expression that legislatures may reg-
ulate. The Jartech and Mitchell Brothers courts confuse bad art with
obscenity, which legislatures deem far more pernicious. When Con-
gress did not include aesthetic merit as a requirement of the copy-
right standard, it did not imply that courts should extend copyright
protection to obscene works. 08 Indeed, Congress failed to include a
prohibition on obscenity protection in the 1976 Act partly because
103. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5659, 5664.
104. 604 F.2d 852, 854-55 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
105. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); supra notes 52-54 and accompanying
text.
106. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
107. Id. at 251. The court in Mitchell Brothers places too much emphasis on this passage
in supporting its obscenity-copyright position. See 604 F.2d at 855-56.
108. The last part of the Miller obscenity text-whether a work has serious artistic
merit-poses a problem in a copyright analysis because Bleistein stated that a work need not
have serious artistic merit to be copyrightable. Thus, even though obscenity inherently lacks
serious artistic merit, a court could declare a work copyrightable notwithstanding its obscenity
under Miller. 188 U.S.C. at 251-52. This argument, however, fails to consider that such a work
per se violates public policy.
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the prevailing common-law rule was that obscenity was not copy-
rightable. Moreover, Congress' position on obscenity is clear: it is
illegal.10 9
Mitchell Brothers and Jartech essentially make the copyright
clause broader than the first amendment. These cases require the
government under copyright law to protect obscene material and to
grant its author a legal monopoly on its use even though the govern-
ment under the first amendment may condemn the material and sub-
ject its author to criminal liability. Most commentators agree that the
first amendment attempts both to foster artistic creativity and to en-
sure political and social development in a free marketplace of
ideas. 110 The copyright clause specifically seeks to provide authors an
economic incentive to encourage their creativity in "'[s]cience and
useful [a]rts.' ,11 Indeed, the first amendment and the copyright
clause are mutually supportive, even though at times copyright law
may limit the unbridled application of the first amendment.1 1 2 From
a standpoint of public policy, courts upset the mutual support be-
tween copyright law and free speech when they afford material ex-
cluded from first amendment protection the economic protection of
copyright.
Although Mitchell Brothers and Jartech discuss similar copy-
right issues, each case arises under very different circumstances. In
Mitchell Brothers plaintiffs sued a cinema for showing a pirated copy
of their film. Defendant then raised the affirmative defense that
plaintiffs cannot have a copyright in the film because it is obscene
and that plaintiffs, therefore, have no grounds for a copyright in-
fringement action. Jartech, however, concerns plaintiffs' offensive use
of a copyright infringement action to counter defendants' efforts to
enforce an antipornography ordinance.1 Defendants eventually
109. See supra note 67.
110. See, e.g., Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the
Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REv. 283, 286 (1979); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge
the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1180 (1970).
111. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
112. Copyright limits free expression because it gives the creator of an original work a
monopoly on the dissemination of that work. Denicola, supra note 110; Nimmer, supra note
110; Comment, The First Amendment Exception to Copyright: A Proposed Text, 1977 Wis. L.
REv. 1158, 1177-78.
113. The obscenity issue can arise in copyright law in at least two other manners: (1) The
Register of Copyrights denies protection based on obscenity, and (2) a court refuses to award a
copyright to either party in a copyright dispute. For a discussion of the first possibility, see
Schneider, Authority of the Register of Copyrights to Deny Registration of a Claim to Copy-
right on the Ground of Obscenity, 51 CHI-KENT L. REv. 691 (1975). Many of the old English
and American copyright-obscenity cases reflect the second possibility. See supra note 10.
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raised the obscenity defense.
Jartech, which recognizes a cause of action for copyright in-
fringement of obscene works, arguably implies that local authorities
risk civil liability whenever they confiscate or copy alleged pornogra-
phy. Of course, the court held against plaintiffs because defendants'
unauthorized photography of the films for evidentiary purposes was a
fair use. 114 Although the statute does not expressly allow copying of a
copyrighted work in gathering evidence for an action to enforce a
municipal ordinance, the Ninth Circuit held that defendants' copying
of the films met the four requirements specified in the statute for a
finding of fair use.115 If other circuits reject the Jartech court's liberal
reading of the fair use provision or if the Supreme Court overrules it,
copyright law significantly would hamper local governments' efforts
to enforce antiobscenity laws. Even if the Ninth Circuit's fair use
theory stands, cities must undergo expensive copyright litigation and
endure protracted appeals to achieve a finding of fair use.11
Jartech and Mitchell Brothers consider only briefly the argu-
ment that the courts frustrate national and local policies against por-
nography by allowing a copyright for obscenity. The court in Mitch-
ell Brothers declared that "the need for an additional check on
obscenity is not apparent."117 Although impossible to quantify pre-
cisely, the pornography business continues to grow substantially.18
Recent reports indicate that organized crime controls much of the
114. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. Under § 107 of the 1976 Act, copying for
the purposes of "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, .... scholarship, or research, is
not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
115. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 90.
117. Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d at 862.
118. Little objective authority exists on exactly how large or profitable the pornography
industry is. One source refers to "the gradual emergence of a whole new industry consisting of
the manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and peddlers of pornography who together conduct a
$500,000,000 business annually." R. KYLE-KEITH, THE HIGH PRICE OF PORNOGRAPHY 41 (1961)
(no authority cited for this estimate). On the other hand, the 1970 Report of the Commission
on Obscenity and Pornography found that an estimation that the industry grossed between
$500 million and $2.5 billion per year was an exaggeration. The Commission countered with its
own study that divided the industry into numerous categories and subcategories. The report
concluded that the "under-the-counter" or "hardcore" pornographic market generated retail
sales between $5 million and $10 million per year. THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCEN-
ITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 7-23 (1970).
The advent of the "sexual revolution" in the early 1970's and the subsequent popularity of
arguably obscene films such as Deep Throat and Behind the Green Door, which was held to be
obscene in Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979),




pornography industry and reaps large profits from it." 9 At the same
time the pornography business has begun profitable ventures in the
burgeoning videocassette and pay television markets. To claim that
additional measures are not necessary to effect the nation's antiob-
scenity policy is simply not correct. In fact, denial of copyrights for
obscene works could discourage those persons who seek to use a cop-
yright's economic benefit to make substantial sums of money in the
pornography business. Indeed, prosecutors recommend that the best
attack on organized crime is to dismantle its economic base. 120 Denial
of copyright protection for obscene works would help to weaken this
base. '2
Thus, courts must explore other alternatives to the holdings of
Mitchell Brothers' and Jartech that obscenity is copyrightable. The
copyright-obscenity problem is more complex than a choice between
the two positions that (1) obscenity cannot be copyrighted; and (2)
obscenity is copyrightable. Part IV investigates ways in which the
courts more effectively may balance the public policy against obscen-
ity and the public policy for uniform copyright protection.
IV. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR OBSCENE WORKS: ALTERNATIVES
AND A PROPOSAL
Because the granting of federal copyright protection to obscene
works conflicts with the nation's policy against obscenity, the courts
should explore all options to ensure realization of the goals of both
copyright law and antiobscenity public policy. This part examines
five options courts may consider in determining the copyrightability
of obscenity. Each of these options assumes application of the Miller
v. California rule, which uses contemporary community standards to
define obscenity.2 2 These options are: (1) adhering to the Martinetti
rule that obscenity, as determined by local standards, is a basis for
119. The Task Force on Organized Crime found that organized crime was very active in
the pornography business, which the task force described as "an extremely profitable and ex-
pansive operation." NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS & GOALS, TASK
FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME, ORGANIZED CRIME 12 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ORGANIZED
CRIME].
120. Id. at 7-8. ("Organized crime has economic gain as its primary goal ... .
121. A denial of copyright may encourage piracy. Those who pirate obscene works, how-
ever, must face state and federal obscenity laws that impose stricter penalties than statutes for
criminal copyright infringement. For example, the maximum penalty for a first offense of mail-
ing obscene materials is five years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976). The
maximum penalty for a first offense of criminal copyright infringement is one year in prison
and a $10,000 fine ($25,000 fine for infringement of sound recording or motion picture). 17
U.S.C. § 506(a) (1976).
122. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
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denying copyright protection; (2) abandoning the Martinetti rule and
acknowledging copyrights of obscene works, even though they may
violate state and federal law; (3) using a national obscenity standard
for all federal obscenity cases, including copyright adjudication; (4)
using a national obscenity standard, or federal common law, to re-
solve copyright cases, 2 s and (5) using a balancing test after a local
finding of obscenity to determine whether the national policy for cop-
yright protection outweighs the national policy against obscenity.
A. Obscenity is Not Copyrightable
Jartech and Mitchell Brothers rejected the first option, which
would require adhering to Martinetti and denying obscenity copy-
right protection. This option would maximize enforcement of the
state and federal policies against obscenity. The great weakness of
this option, as the Jartech court noted,1 1 4 is the fragmentation of fed-
eral copyright law that results from local standards defining obscen-
ity. In Miller v. California'"5 Chief Justice Burger wrote, "It is
neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amend-
ment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept
public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas or New
York City."' 26 Copyright law, however, envisions uniform application
throughout the country. If a work is obscene and hence uncopyright-
able in Mississippi, must a federal court in New York consider the
Mississippi finding in a copyright infringement action?'17 If the Mis-
sissippi finding is not applicable in a New York proceeding and the
New York community standard determines anew the question of ob-
scenity, then the copyright law would be different in Mississippi and
New York and thus fragment Congress' intended uniformity. 2 8
Therefore, Jartech and Mitchell Brothers correctly abandoned the
Martinetti standard.
123. Under § 301(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976; all legal and equitable rights conferred
by the federal statute "are governed exclusively by this title." 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1976). Works
created before 1978, the effective date of the statute, may fall under portions of the 1909 Act.
124. Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d at 406.
125. 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
126. Id. at 32.
127. If local standards affect copyright infringement suits, defendants would seek adjudi-
cations in the states with the most conservative standards of obscenity to win copyright suits in
more liberal jurisdictions.
128. See Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d at 406.
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B. Obscenity is Always Copyrightable
To replace the Martinetti rule, Jartech and Mitchell Brothers
adopt the second option: obscene works may receive copyright pro-
tection. The weakness of the Ninth and Fifth Circuits' statutory in-
terpretation of the copyright acts is discussed above. 129 The advan-
tage of this position is that it preserves the national policy for
uniform copyright protection and avoids potentially difficult determi-
nations of obscenity. Giving an obscene work federal copyright pro-
tection, however, implies that an author freely can distribute his cre-
ation and reap financial rewards for the life of the copyright.
Arguably, states that find the author's work obscene may (1) violate
the commerce clause if they confiscate or otherwise prevent the sale
of the work or its passage through the jurisdiction,130 and (2) violate
the supremacy clause because the state's finding of obscenity effec-
tively supersedes the author's federal protection under copyright
law.13 1 A balancing of the national policy against obscenity with the
national uniformity of copyright protection could remedy these
problems; Jartech and Mitchell Brothers ignore such a balancing.132
C. National Obscenity Standard for Federal Obscenity Cases
Because a substantial body of federal law concerns obscenity,
some courts have argued that a national obscenity standard should
apply in federal cases. 33 A determination of the validity of an ob-
scene work's copyright requires enforcement of federal law and hence
an action in which a court would apply a national obscenity standard.
A national standard would allow a court to evaluate the national
public policy for copyright and the national public policy against ob-
scenity. A court, therefore, could determine whether the degree of
obscenity outweighs any arguments for federal protection. Under this
interpretation, states could regulate obscenity within their borders,
but copyright cases would not rely upon their determinations of
129. See supra, part III(C).
130. The commerce clause provides in relevant part that: "Congress shall have Power to
regulate Commerce. . .among the several States. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The commerce
clause issue arose in Miller and the Court summarily dismissed it based on a state's police
power within its borders. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 32 n.13. If the obscene materials merely pass
through the state and are not to be sold within the state, a constitutional violation might exist
if the barrier to commerce is unreasonable. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
131. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
132. See supra part III(C).




The Supreme Court, however, implicitly has rejected a national
obscenity standard for federal copyright cases. In Hamling v. United
States"5 the Court held that Miller and its companion cases dis-
carded a national standard for federal obscenity prosecutions. 136 In
Hamling the trial court had instructed the jury to use a national
standard for obscenity in reaching its verdict. The Supreme Court
refused to apply Miller retrospectively and held that the instruction
did not materially affect the jury's deliberation.13 7 Although the
Court affirmed the contemporary community standards approach to
obscenity, it noted that the Constitution does not mandate such a
definition.' Nonetheless, the overwhelming weight of Hamling re-
jects the use of a federal obscenity standard. 3 '
D. National Obscenity Standard in Copyright Cases
Two of the dominant characteristics of American copyright law
are its national scope and its emphasis on uniformity. As Professor
Nimmer has noted: "Absent such comprehensive protection it seems
clear that, . . the subject matter of copyright would have been fa-
tally crippled."' 40 Indeed, in enacting the 1976 Act Congress consid-
ered the need for a uniform, national policy on copyright protec-
tion.' 4 1 With few exceptions, the 1976 Act preempts state copyright
law. 42 Conversely, both the states and the federal government regu-
late obscenity.' 43 The Supreme Court's community standards defini-
tion of obscenity, which the Court has adopted for state and federal
134. See infra part IV(E).
135. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
136. Id. at 104-105.
137. Consider this explanation of the community standards approach: "A juror is entitled
to draw on his own knowledge of the views of the average person in the community or vicinity
from which he comes for making the required determination .... ." Id. at 104.
138. Id. at 105. The Court indicated that a community standard did not proscribe obscen-
ity in any certain geographic area "as a matter of constitutional law." Id.
139. The Hamling decision, however, applied only to federal obscenity prosecutions.
Thus, the use of a national obscenity standard may still be a viable option in civil copyright
cases.
140. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 20, § 1.01[A], 1-5.
141. According to the House Report, the 1976 Legislation sought to increase the uniform-
ity of national copyright protection. "Today, when the methods for dissemination of an au-
thor's work are incomparably broader and faster than they were in 1789, national uniformity in
copyright protection is even more essential than it was then to carry out the constitutional
intent." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5659, 5745; see M. NIMMER, supra note 20, § 1.01[A].
142. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 67 & 98 and accompanying text.
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prosecutions, 1 " is reasonable when state and local governments have
enforcement powers equal to the federal government's powers. The
community standards approach, however, is inappropriate when it in-
fluences an area of law that Congress has preempted. 45 Even though
the Supreme Court requires the application of community standards
to federal obscenity cases, this holding arguably should not apply to
copyright cases, which courts now decide entirely under federal law.
Like admiralty, copyright is within the exclusive fed ral jurisdic-
tion and any local standards that conflict with the national policy of
uniformity for copyright should not apply. A court's decision regard-
ing copyrights for obscene works should be a matter of federal com-
mon law,146 and its determination of whether a work at issue in a
copyright case is obscene should reflect the national policy against
obscenity. 147 Indeed, the states still could assert control within their
borders over materials they deem obscene by enforcing their anti-
pornography and nuisance laws.
148
E. A Balancing Test
This Recent Development proposes the use of a national stan-
dard to determine the copyrightability of obscene works.149 A court
could analyze obscenity with a national standard in the following two
ways: (1) ignore a state's determination of obscenity and make its
own determination of obscenity under the Miller test 50 by using a
national standard in place of- contemporary community standards for
the purposes of deciding whether it should allow copyright; or (2)
consider the state obscenity standard but only preclude copyright
when the work violates national obscenity policy to the extent that it
weighs against the national copyright policy. Using either method-a
de novo obscenity determination or a national obscenity-copyright
policy balancing-a court should identify and evaluate the several
national policies regarding obscenity that could override the national
policy for copyright. Although the federal government and the states
share many of the same policies against obscenity, this Recent Devel-
144. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973).
145. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
146. One case io suggest this argument in the area of conflict of laws is Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). See also Leverson, supra note 21, for discussion
of a national obscenity and copyright standard before Mitchell Brothers and Jartech.
147. See supra note 67; infra part IV(E).
148. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
149. See supra part IV(D).
150. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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opment discusses four considerations of national policy that may
make denial or invalidation of a copyright appropriate.
1. Degree of Obscenity
Once a court determines that a work is "obscene," the work loses
first amendment protection and is subject to regulation under state
and federal law. 151 A work found obscene under the Miller standard
nevertheless could gain copyright protection 152 because the Miller
test and the copyright statute are inconsistent. The third part of the
Miller test requires a finding that the work lacks "serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value." ' The Copyright Act of 1976,
however, protects all "original works of authorship fixed in any tangi-
ble medium of expression ' 54 and does not require serious artistic
value as a prerequisite.1 55 Thus, despite a finding of a lack of serious
literary or artistic value, an obscene work technically may receive
copyright protection. This analysis, however, ignores the national
policy against obscenity.
Although courts frequently have tried to distinguish "hardcore"
pornography from legitimate artistic treatments of sex,15 6 they have
devoted little discussion to degrees of obscenity.15 7 Justice Harlan,
however, has suggested that degrees of obscenity differentiate the
state and federal interests in regulating obscenity.15 8 Justice Harlan
151. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957).
152. The Mitchell Brothers court makes a similar argument. See 604 F.2d at 859 n.15.
153. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (emphasis added).
154. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
155. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithograph Co., 188 U.S.
239 (1903), cogently stated that it would not evaluate the artistic or literary value of a work in
the copyright determination. The Miller Court, however, appeared willing to establish a stan-
dard that would require a court to determine whether a work had "serious" literary or artistic
merit. 413 U.S. at 24.
156. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496-
98 (1957).
157. Courts undoubtedly have avoided classifying obscenity because the task is so formi-
dable: if obscenity is difficult to define, then degrees of obscenity are even more difficult to
characterize. Indeed, one of the main problems with denying copyright protection to works
displaying a "high degree" of obscenity is that a precise categorization of obscenity into various
degrees is not immediately apparent.
158. Justice Harlan argued that the states have a much stronger interest in regulating
obscenity than the federal government. Although one state bans a book, other states may deem
that same work acceptable. If the federal government holds a work obscene, however, it bans
the work nationally. Justice Harlan advocated a higher standard for defining "obscenity" in
federal cases-limiting prosecutions to "hardcore" pornography-to guard against "the very
real danger of a deadening uniformity which can result from nation-wide federal censorship."
Roth v. United States, 354, U.S. 476, 506 (Harlan, J., concurring in Alberts v. California and
dissenting in Roth) (1957) (discussion of Justice Harlan's state-federal obscenity theory at 496-
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argued that the federal government can regulate only "hardcore"
pornography while the states have authority to define obscenity more
broadly.'59 Although a majority of the Court never accepted Justice
Harlan's approach, his separation of state and federal regulatory in-
terests by the degree of obscenity is helpful in a copyright analysis.
Congress or the federal courts could define a particular zone of ob-
scenity in which the national interest in obscenity regulation would
require a denial of copyright protection.6 0
The primary weakness in this element of the analysis is the diffi-
culty courts would face in determining the degrees of obscenity.
Other than Justice Harlan's categorization of "hardcore" pornogra-
phy, the courts, with one notable exception,'-' have been reluctant to
measure obscenity in degrees. Nonetheless as courts use the Miller
test more often, judges, especially at the federal level, may find that
public policy requires characterization of obscenity in degrees.
2. Presence of Organized Crime
The courts should closely scrutinize obscene materials that origi-
nate from sources that are associated with organized crime and that
use copyright protection to ensure lucrative national distribution.1
2
Although the association with organized crime may be difficult to
508).
159. Id. at 500-07. Justice Harlan said that the federal interest in obscenity regulation is
"attenuated." Id. at 504-05. This Recent Development argues that a distinct set of "national"
concerns may exist that makes denial of federal copyright protection appropriate. Neither Jus-
tice Harlan nor the Supreme Court ever confronted the copyright-obscenity issue.
The federal government has not become the intrusive censor that Justice Harlan feared. In
fact, the Supreme Court occasionally has acted as an obscenity referee to make sure the
states-not the federal government-respect national first amendment rights. See Jenkins v.
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (unanimous Court overturned Georgia obscenity conviction for
showing the critically acclaimed film Carnal Knowledge).
160. If one assumes that the government should regulate obscenity because obscenity may
drive people to antisocial sexual conduct, as Chief Justice Burger noted in Paris Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1973), certain types of obscenity that graphically depict sex and
violence incite the reader-viewer to violent criminal conduct. The national interest in regulating
these works would be strong. Admittedly, however, some studies show that the purported link
between crime and obscenity is tenuous at best. See THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OB-
SCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 26-32 (1970).
161. In New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348, on remand sub nom. People v. Ferber, 57
N.Y.2d 256, 441 N.E.2d 1100, 455 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1982), the Court recognized child pornography
as a special category of unprotected expression. See infra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
The Court held that states could restrict the distribution of child pornography through crimi-
nal statutes, even though the material was not obscene under Miller.
162. One recent report referred to organized crime's financial success in pornography and
noted that the profitable business is national in scope. See ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 119,
at 12.
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prove, the courts should be sensitive to the characteristics of a crimi-
nal syndicate"'3 and should deny copyright protection to materials
emanating from such a syndicate. In one recent federal racketeering
prosecution, the government indicted members of a pornography op-
eration that was linked to organized crime for their involvement in a
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) "enter-
prise. '16 4 Awarding the financial protection of a copyright to organ-
ized criminal activity furthers the lucrative national distribution of
pornography and frustrates at least in part the extensive efforts of
federal law enforcement agencies to dismantle the economic base of
organized crime.
3. Sexual Exploitation of Children
Pornography, often considered a "victimless crime," becomes a
more serious public policy concern when it depicts the sexual per-
formances of children. Recently in New York v. Ferber'6 5 a unani-
mous Supreme Court upheld a New York child pornography stat-
ute166 and noted that the sexual exploitation of children is a problem
of national concern. 67 Additionally, the Court stressed that con-
certed national law enforcement must remove the economic incen-
tives for the production and distribution of child pornography.,68
Thus, as a matter of public policy, courts should deny copyright pro-
tection to obscene works that use children in a sexually exploitative
163. Id. at 7-8. "Organized crime is a type of conspiratorial crime, sometimes involving
the hierarchical coordination of a number of persons in the planning and execution of illegal
acts, or in the pursuit of a legitimate objective by unlawful means." Id. at 7.
164. See United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979). In this prosecution
under Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981), the government attacked the pornography ring because it was an "association in
fact" operating in a pattern of racketeering activity. Id. § 1961(4). Federal obscenity crimes,
however, are not RICO predicate offenses, although a pornography operation could facilitate a
racketeering enterprise.
165. 102 S. Ct. 3348, on remand sub nom. People v. Ferber, 57 N.Y.2d 256, 441 N.E.2d
1100, 455 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1982).
166. The New York statute provided in pertinent part: "A person is guilty of the use of a
child in a sexual performance if knowing the character and consent thereof he employs, autho-
rizes or induces a child less than sixteen years of age to engage in a sexual performance. .. "
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.05 (McKinney 1980). The law also prohibits "promoting" a sexual per-
formance by a child in "any play, motion picture, photograph or dance." Id. §§ 263.15,
263.00(4). The Ferber Court noted that 20 states, including New York, had similar child por-
nography statutes. 102 S. Ct. at 3351 n.2.
167. 102 S. Ct. at 3355-56.
168. Id. at 3357. "The advertising and selling of child pornography provides an economic
motive for and is thus an integral part of the production of such materials, an activity illegal
throughout the nation." Id.
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manner. 69 Copyright invalidation may be only a minor obstruction to
the production and distribution of this kind of pornography, but the
removal of copyright protection directly affects the marketability of
the work and would be a part of the national enforcement effort the
Supreme Court envisioned in Ferber.
170
4. Marketability of the Work
The rapid technological progress in the communications industry
has enabled authors to distribute their work not only in conventional
forms such as books, magazines, and films, but also by such modern
methods as cable and microwave television, satellite broadcasting,
and videocassettes. These marketing options also are available to
pornographers. Both Congress and the courts must realize, therefore,
that "obscene" works will enjoy a wider, more profitable distribution
in the coming decade. 71 For example, the copyright tribunal for
cable broadcasting 17 2 and the possible creation of a similar tribunal
169. The Ferber Court held that states may regulate child pornography even though it is
not "obscene" under the Miller test. The Court held that the overwhelming compelling interest
in prosecuting the promoters of child pornography removes the issue from traditional obscenity
analysis. Id. at 3356. This Recent Development advocates that a court find a work "obscene"
before it considers a denial of copyright protection.
170. Id. at 3354-58. See also Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A
Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535 (1981) (discussion of widespread sexual exploitation of
children).
171. Because the content of cable television, microwave, and satellite broadcasting is not
subject to the same scrutiny that the Federal Communications Commission gives to television
broadcasters, these new communication systems enjoy greater freedom in transmitting sexually
explicit programming. Whether these new forms of broadcasting will create a viable market for
obscenity is uncertain, but the sale of pornographic video cassettes appears to provide a lucra-
tive new source of revenue for the pornography industry. Arguably, since the new media sys-
tems transmit programming directly into the private home, the state interest in regulating ob-
scenity is reduced. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (private possession of
obscene material in the home is protected by constitutional right of privacy).
Some states, however, have attempted to regulate the content of sexual material on cable
television by enacting criminal statutes. For example, the Utah legislature enacted a statute
that imposed criminal penalties upon any person, including a cable television franchise, who
"knowingly distribute[s] by wire or cable any pornographic or indecent material to its sub-
scribers." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1229(1) (Supp. 1981) (emphasis added). A federal court in
Utah held that the statute was unconstitutionally broad because it proscribed nonobscene
materials protected by the first amendment. Home Box Office v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 987
(D.C. Utah 1982). The court noted that the statute's definition of "indecent" included nudity
and partial nudity, which the Supreme Court has said is not necessarily obscene. Id. at 1113.
172. Cable operators must pay royalties to the creators of copyrighted program material
that they use. First, cable operators must obtain a copyright license and periodically pay roy-
alty fees into a central fund. Second, the Copyright Royalty Tribunal distributes these fees
among the claimants. 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-810 (1976). The tribunal distributed $15 million for
1978, the first year of distribution; 75% of this money went to program syndicates and movie
producers. See National Assoc. of Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 8 MED. L. REP.
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for home video recording 13 could make the distribution of obscene
films even more profitable. Therefore, a decision to award copyright
protection to obscene works could result in a direct financial benefit
to the copyright holder and thus provide an incentive for the produc-
tion of more obscene works. Sound public policy requires the denial
of such financial rewards to those works that by definition are illegal
and violative of national policy.
17 4
V. CONCLUSION
Using the community standards test for obscenity to invalidate a
federal copyright creates a conflict between two policies that nor-
mally are mutually supportive. Jartech and Mitchell Brothers recog-
nized this problem, but they go too far in granting eligibility for cop-
yright protection to all obscene works. The incongruous result is that
the government confers lucrative copyright protection to the same
business that it tries to eliminate through antiobscenity laws. The
Supreme Court's community standards definition of obscenity is not
a constitutional standard, and no decision of the Court has prohib-
ited the use of a national standard in copyright cases. In determining
whether an "obscene" work should have copyright protection, a court
should balance the national policies supporting copyright with the
national policies against obscenity. Jartech and Mitchell Brothers
justly abandoned the archaic Martinetti rule and departed from 200
years of copyright and obscenity jurisprudence. Now the courts and
Congress should refine this new approach.
KURT L. SCHMALZ
(BNA) 1432, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
173. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony
Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982), and conceiva-
bly could require a copyright tribunal similar to the cable tribunal for the home video recording
industry. The Ninth Circuit in Sony declared that home video recording violates the federal
copyright laws and that the fair use provisions of the Copyright Act do not excuse the infringe-
ment. Id. at 972-74.
174. This Recent Development does not argue that the in-home use of obscene materials
is against national public policy. Perhaps the federal interest in regulating private use of ob-
scene materials is so attenuated that a court should not deny copyright protection. This Recent
Development proposes judicial balancing between national anti-obscenity policies and the na-
tional copyright law. The Jartech and Mitchell Brothers opinions disregarded the need for
balancing or the existence of a national interest in regulating obscenity.
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